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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis evaluates emergencies that are likely to occur in metropolitan 
transportation centers and the challenges emergency managers face when preparing for 
them. Specifically examining nine co-located transportation agencies in California’s San 
Francisco Bay Area, the research identifies methods emergency managers can use to 
enhance preparedness coordination and collaboration across multiple transportation 
agencies where, despite their different governance structures and base locations, 
operations overlap. The author examined best practices among existing emergency 
preparedness documents and offers six recommendations that can enhance cross-agency 
coordination: 1) adopting an all-hazards approach, 2) defining a common method, 3) 
involving the “whole community” in preparedness activities, 4) enhancing 
resource-allocation techniques, 5) establishing a method for continuity of operations in a 
combined emergency operations center, and 6) hardening existing infrastructure. 
 Going forward, the nine agencies in the study area must establish a year-long pilot 
program to evaluate emergency preparedness methods, which should include regular 
table-top exercises and the eventual establishment of a regional transportation emergency 
operations center (RTEOC). These exercises will also help the agencies establish clear 
roles and responsibilities, which will provide the public with better protection during 
emergencies. 
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This thesis evaluates emergencies that are likely to occur in metropolitan 
transportation centers and the challenges emergency managers face when preparing for 
them. With infrastructure and people concentrated in one area, an emergency event—
such as an earthquake or terrorist attack—can be devastating. Specifically, this thesis 
argues that all the transportation facilities that operate in a concentrated area must 
coordinate and act as a joint facility for emergency preparedness purposes. Doing so will 
reduce inherent risk to the agencies and the surrounding region. Currently, agencies in the 
San Francisco Bay Area coordinate on some level, but if they strengthen collaboration 
efforts they can provide better protection to both human and infrastructure resources 
across the region.  
Transportation has repeatedly been the target of manmade and terrorist threats.1 
The Critical Infrastructures Protection Act of 2001 defines critical infrastructure as 
“systems and assets … so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of 
such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security [and] national 
economic security.”2 Further, the Patriot Act identifies the transportation sector as one of 
sixteen key sectors of critical infrastructure.3 In 2003, Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 5 addressed the need to enhance critical infrastructure resiliency through 
coordinated and collaborative efforts at various levels of operations in order to strengthen 
security and resilience.4 Some related work has been done at the public safety level, but 
more work is needed at the administrative and operations level to ensure that 
transportation agencies are providing a safe environment for the surrounding agencies 
                                                 
1 Yuko Nakanishi et al., “Assessing Emergency Preparedness of Transit Agencies,” Transportation 
Research Record 1822 (January 2003): 24–32, http://doi.org/10.3141/1822-04.  
2 White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, PPD-21 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/ 
12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil. 
3 USA Patriot Act, United States Public Law 107–56, U.S. Statutes at Large 115 (2001), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-115/pdf/STATUTE-115-Pg272.pdf.  
4 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Management of Domestic Incidents, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-5 (Washington, DC: DHS, 2003).  
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and communities. With the San Francisco Bay Area as its main example, this thesis 
recommends enhancing emergency preparedness by improving coordination and 
collaboration between agencies that work in close proximity to each other. Doing so will 
enhance emergency preparedness and reduce inherent risk to the agencies and the 
surrounding region.  
Millions of transportation system customers and tons of cargo routinely pass 
through a particular regional transportation center in the Bay Area. Operations must run 
smoothly and uninterrupted at all times. Nine agencies operate a variety of modes of 
transportation, serving a wide range of customers—from international travelers, to local 
commuters, to cargo. Several of the Bay Area transportation agencies examined in this 
thesis already work together in some fashion, but they do not fully coordinate emergency 
preparedness activities. Each agency has a distinct governing board, finance 
requirements, and regulatory standards that govern their operations, and varying levels of 
government oversee these agencies. During emergencies, many of these agencies need 
resources that are housed outside the immediate area; some are located a great distance 
away and are potentially not accessible in emergency conditions. The agencies, their 
passengers, and the community will benefit from advance collaborative planning that will 
help allocate critical resources during an emergency.  
To evaluate overall emergency preparedness, this thesis reviews existing open-
source emergency documents from nine Bay Area transportation agencies, as well as best 
practices used to protect transit infrastructure both in other U.S. cities and internationally. 
Based on best practices, the thesis offers recommendations the Bay Area agencies can 
implement to enhance the regional transportation system’s emergency preparedness. The 
recommendations fall into six categories: 1) adopting an all-hazards approach to 
emergency planning, 2) establishing single channels of communication, 3) approaching 
emergency preparedness as a “whole community” effort, 4) coordinating resource 
allocation, 5) establishing continuity of operations over extended periods of time, and 6) 
hardening infrastructure.  
Ultimately, this thesis argues that in order to optimally prepare for emergencies, 
multiple co-located agencies must move beyond their independent authorities and 
 xvii 
establish enhanced collaboration and coordination on a system-wide scale. The 
recommendations suggest mechanisms that can improve operational protocols used to 
protect the agencies, their employees, nearby residents, and commuters. It is also 
recommended that the Bay Area agencies establish a year-long pilot program to 
implement a regional transportation–oriented emergency operations center to evaluate the 
benefits of this collaborative approach. This proof-of-concept effort will give the various 
agencies much-needed time to develop methods for working more closely in emergency 
scenarios. These efforts will also likely lead to longer-term solutions, will help the 
agencies establish resource-sharing agreements, and will allow them to form a regional 
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We know we cannot underestimate the importance of emergency planning 
in our region, nor can we assume we’ll have ample warning time. If an 
earthquake or terrorist attack hits, we won’t necessarily have advance 
alerts or opportunities to double- and triple-check our plans. 
—California Bay Area Representative Ellen Tauscher1 
 
Millions of commuters and tons of cargo routinely pass through a Bay Area 
regional transportation center (TC) located adjacent to the San Francisco International 
Airport. The TC’s operations must run smoothly at all times; an interruption to any one of 
the services can disrupt transportation systems regionally, statewide, nationwide, and 
internationally. While each individual agency’s emergency preparedness is important, it 
is also critical for multiple agencies to coordinate and collaborate during emergencies to 
ensure continued operation of the regional TC. Successful collaboration requires well-
planned and exercised emergency preparedness activities. 
This thesis examines methods that can enhance emergency preparedness 
coordination and collaboration between multiple transportation agencies that have 
varying governance structures, co-located operation bases, and differing modes of 
transportation. The thesis reviews the relationship between the San Francisco Bay Area’s 
transportation modes and makes recommendations for improved collaboration based on 
best practices. Additionally, the thesis develops a framework for establishing a jointly 
operated regional transportation emergency operations center (RTEOC).  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In his work on critical infrastructure, Ted Lewis asserts that resilience informs 
decision-making.2 This thesis focuses on resilience by suggesting methods to enhance 
                                                 
1 “Ellen Tauscher Quotes,” Brainy Quote, accessed April 4, 2018, https://www.brainyquote.com/ 
quotes/ellen_tauscher_362456. 
2 Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked 
Nation (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2015), 163.  
 2 
emergency preparedness coordination and collaboration. The main research questions 
are: 
• How can contiguous transportation agencies enhance their emergency 
preparedness coordination and collaboration? 
• Can related findings regarding the San Francisco Bay Area be applied to 
any metropolitan area where multiple transportation agencies—or 
agencies from other sectors—are located in close proximity to each other? 
By examining the Bay Area TC’s co-located transportation agencies, this work provides a 
template for enhancing agency coordination and collaboration during emergencies.  
Transportation agencies must be prepared for all types of service interruptions—
including those caused by manmade disasters and terrorist acts. Robust public 
transportation can help neighborhoods recover faster from disasters; in areas where it is 
easy to use public transit, people can still get around even if they cannot use their 
personal vehicles. Public transportation agencies historically have served a critical role 
for emergency response by providing mobility and evacuation resources before, during, 
and after disasters. To help those in harm’s way, public transportation often maintains 
service during crises when it is safe to operate—public transportation can help evacuate 
people from threatened areas, rescue vulnerable populations and people with disabilities, 
and transport emergency personnel during fires, floods, hurricanes, windstorms, and 
winter storms. According to the Federal Transit Administration, 30,000 people were 
evacuated by public transit systems during Hurricanes Harvey and Irma.3  
U.S. transportation agencies also operate critical infrastructure that is key to the 
security and prosperity of communities, regions, states, and the nation. Because the many 
transportation nodes are interconnected, they must coordinate with each other to ensure 
security. Traditionally, when it comes to emergency preparedness, transportation 
                                                 
3 Security Risk Management Working Group, Recommended Practice for the Development and 
Implementation of a Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan (SEPP), APTA SS-SRM-RP-001-09, 
Rev. 1 (Washington, DC: American Public Transportation Association, 2012), http;//www.apta.com/ 
resources/standards/Documents/APTA-SS-SRM-RP-001-09.pdf.  
 3 
providers develop individual plans that are specific to each agency. While these 
emergency plans place emphasis on coordination of public safety efforts, they do not give 
much focus to, and often do not even mention, operational and administrative functions. 
Under normal circumstances, these individual agencies have limited need to coordinate 
services, and each reports to a different level of government, with separate governing 
structures. However, in an emergency, these varying levels of government, representing 
multiple modes of transportation and occupying the same geographic space, need to work 
together to protect the public, adjacent communities, and all the agencies’ assets. This 
thesis identifies methods that can enhance coordination and collaboration between these 
agencies. 
Different transportation agencies, just like agencies in all sectors, may engage in a 
variety of emergency preparedness efforts.4 Because plans are also drafted over time, 
they are likely to lack consistent or standardized material. As mentioned, current 
emergency preparedness efforts focus more on public safety than on transit agencies’ 
operations and management, or on cross-agency coordination. Without coordination at all 
levels, there are problems with allocation of available resources (including personnel and 
equipment), inefficient communication, and duplicated efforts. Coordinated plans for 
continuity of operations between transit agencies are needed to help people travel to and 
from the area during emergencies. The region, and adjacent communities, should be 
concerned about the necessary flow of goods and services to an area impacted by an 
emergency. To improve these operations, all segments of the community should be 
involved in emergency planning.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review first examines available information about terrorist threats 
that target transportation. It then examines the current state of emergency management 
collaboration and coordination in general (not specific to transportation agencies). 
                                                 
4 San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office of Emergency Services, “County of San Mateo Emergency 




Finally, it reviews collaboration and coordination practices specific to transportation 
center emergency preparedness, including current practices in the San Francisco Bay 
Area.  
As terrorist threats in the United States increase, terrorists have evolved from 
targeting mainly air travel to targeting other modes of transportation as well.5 This gives 
us good cause to enhance emergency preparedness, especially as many transportation 
operations are co-located. In his 2005 work, Brian Taylor, director of the Institute of 
Transportation at UCLA, indicates that terrorists have targeted transportation critical 
infrastructure in order to exact economic impact and attract attention.6 A study by RAND 
furthermore shows that without standardization of readiness, emergency preparedness 
suffers.7 Other emergency management sectors, such as law enforcement, provide 
examples of interagency coordination in preparedness efforts. The Seattle and Houston 
metro areas have recently studied information sharing between law enforcement and 
non–law enforcement entities during emergency incidents.8 While these examples do not 
discuss operators and administrators for transportation agencies, they provide useful 
formats for coordination during emergency incidents.9 The California Office of 
Emergency Services (Cal OES) also publishes after-action reports and other documents 
about regional emergency preparedness. These documents, too, do not speak to 
transportation operations; they focus on preparing individual agencies or providers. 
Within a single operational region, materials for emergency preparedness training vary—
                                                 
5 Mineta Transportation Institute, “Transit Is a Terrorist Target,” Mass Transit, June 1, 2016, 
http://www.masstransitmag.com/press_release/12215001/transit-is-a-terrorist-target. 
6 Brian D. Taylor, Designing and Operating Safe and Secure Transit Systems: Assessing Current 
Practices in the United States and Abroad, MTI Report 04-05 (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation 
Institute, 2005). 
7 Lois M. Davis et al., When it Comes to Terrorism, How Prepared Are Local and State Agencies? 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006).  
8 Noor Elmitiny, Shankar Ramasamy, and Assam Radwan, “Emergency Evacuation Planning and 
Preparedness of Transit Facilities: Traffic Simulation Modeling,” Transportation Research Record 1992 
(January 2007): 121–26, http://doi.org/10.3141/1992-14. 
9 Anthony Spangler, “Fort Worth, Texas, Leaders Question Value of Terror Alerts to Cities,” 
HighBeam Research, May 11, 2002, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-92744925.html?refid=easy_hf. 
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some use standardized formats while others are individualized, agency-specific after-
action reports. 
According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), enhanced 
emergency preparedness requires planning, coordination with adjacent agencies, and 
collaboration with similar agencies. Cal OES reports provide a format for standardization 
in after-action reporting.10 However, the standardization for Cal OES appears only to 
occur within individual agencies. During emergency events, all the agencies that operate 
in a single location could collaborate more effectively if they used a single standardized 
framework. Lessons learned from national and international incidents at transportation 
centers do not appear to routinely trickle down into regional-level training.  
The U.S. Department of Transportation has reported lessons learned from 
transportation-affecting attacks in the eastern United States.11 The department provides 
planning guidelines for individual agencies that lack coordination across multiple 
transportation modes. The guidance also suggests minimizing the number of agencies 
responsible for transportation and providing coordinating authority. None of the research, 
however, provides specific guidance for multiple modes or agencies that have drastically 
different responsibilities, which is the focus of this research. Taylor’s work, Designing 
and Operating Safe and Secure Transit Systems, assesses both U.S. and international 
practices, providing examples of methods that can be used to coordinate emergency 
services.12 His work, however, is somewhat dated; it was completed just a few years 
after 9/11 and, as such, predates some of the recent transportation system attacks in the 
United States and Europe. Following 9/11, homeland security efforts focused on public 
safety methods to improve emergency preparedness. This thesis examines emergency 
preparedness coordination among agencies beyond the public safety level and helps 
identify gaps. 
                                                 
10 “After Action-Corrective Action Reporting,” California Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), 
accessed August 13, 2017, http://www.caloes.ca.gov/cal-oes-divisions/planning-preparedness/after-action-
corrective-action-reporting. 
11 National Research Council, Improving Surface Transportation Security, A Research and 
Development Strategy (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1999). 
12 Taylor, Safe and Secure Transit Systems. 
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C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The study area selected for this thesis is located adjacent to the San Francisco 
International Airport, in the Bay Area. This thesis, in Chapter II, briefly describes the 
relationship between the area’s nine agencies, the location of each agency’s headquarters, 
and the services that each provides. The thesis also examines the agencies’ planning 
documents for information about coordination and collaboration; by examining current 
protocols and best practices in tandem, the research identifies emergency preparedness 
gaps between these agencies, which have never been scrutinized together, as a group. 
Additionally, the thesis reviews case studies of cities across the United States and on the 
international stage in order to provide further recommendations.  
Currently, when agencies conduct emergency drills, public safety personnel move 
freely across lines of access; management and operations staff, however, have difficulty 
gaining access to emergency operations sites. Drills often focus on public safety but do 
not include all community stakeholders, such as those from the business community, 
local government representatives, utility operations volunteers, non-profit workers, food 
service workers, and representatives from other local sectors. When multiple agencies 
occupy the same space or operate adjacent to each other, emergency planning should be 
coordinated and should encompass all levels of the various agencies.  
For data and evidence, this thesis reviews documents from the Bay Area agencies, 
regional emergency operations center (EOC) plans, and state- and federal-level 
emergency preparedness plans. In addition, the research discusses practices at both the 
national and international level to determine what has worked for transportation facilities 
during emergencies in the last decade. When after-action reports or documentation is 
missing, this is also considered evidence. Research also extends to information about best 
practices available online.13 All the reviewed information is open source, and includes 
emergency planning reports in a variety of formats.  
                                                 
13 Chris Ansell, Arjen Boin, and Ann C. Keller, “Managing Transboundary Crises: Identifying the 
Building Blocks of an Effective Response System,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 18, 
no. 4 (December 2010): 195–207, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1708305.  
 7 
As far as analysis, the research compares the different ways personnel, equipment, 
and resources are used for emergency response. A matrix compares factors, such as 
mechanisms for coordinating operations and identifying gaps in operations. The research 
also seeks to determine if standardizing emergency practices would improve agencies’ 
preparedness and outcomes during incidents. Metrics of analysis include FEMA’s 
standards for emergency preparedness, among others. In addition to the agency analysis, 
this work examines the extent to which the agencies coordinate with adjacent 
communities and how well the resources available in those communities have been 
optimized for use during emergency incidents. When an emergency situation unfolds 
within this complex matrix of government and authorities, each individual agency’s 
readiness affects all the other agencies in the area, as well as transportation users and 
adjacent communities.  
Other than the Bay Area TC agencies specifically discussed within the thesis, this 
research may also be of interest to FEMA, the Federal Transportation Agency, homeland 
security practitioners, the Federal Aviation Agency, Cal OES, and other EOCs in San 
Francisco and San Mateo County. The result of this research is recommendations for 
coordination among the involved agencies in advance of an emergency incident.14 When 
protocols are established before emergencies occur, they result in coordinated, planned 
exercises and drills.15 This work provides special districts with a model that can help 
them analyze and improve emergency preparedness between co-located agencies.  
This research does not examine such modes of transportation as water, bicycles, 
or pedestrians. It also does not explore if, or how often, best practices are exercised. 
D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Following this introduction, Chapter II defines the Bay Area TC framework and 
describes barriers that currently prevent coordination and collaboration. Chapter III 
                                                 
14 “State Safety Oversight (SSO) Program,” Federal Transit Administration, updated June 19, 2017, 
https://www.transit.dot.gov/regulations-and-guidance/safety/state-safety-oversight-sso-program.  
15 Frances L. Edwards and Daniel C. Goodrich, Emergency Management Training and Exercises for 
Transportation Agency Operations, MTI Report 09-17 (San Jose, CA: Mineta Transportation Institute, 
2010). 
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compares the nine agencies’ emergency planning documents, while Chapter IV examines 
case studies in the United States and abroad. Findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations for enhanced preparedness are presented in Chapter V, and Chapter VI 




II. THE BAY AREA FRAMEWORK 
This chapter examines the Bay Area transportation center (TC) and its nine co-
located agencies. The facilities that these agencies operate provide the Bay Area with key 
links to the region, the nation, and the world.  
The San Francisco Bay Area, located in northern California, has a population of 
more than 7 million and an employment market of nearly 3.5 million jobs, making it the 
fourth largest employment region in the country.16 The Bay Area encompasses nine 
counties that each touch the San Francisco Bay; the counties comprise 100 cities and 
more than 7,000 square miles of land connected by at least eight bridges. “The region 
boasts nearly 20,000 miles of local streets and roads, 1,400 miles of highway, five public 
ports and three major commercial airports. More than two dozen public transit agencies 
operate in the region, and passengers make more than 2 million trips a day in 4,000-plus 
transit vehicles … placing this region among the top transit markets in the nation.”17 
Figure 1 shows the regional location of the study area adjacent to San Francisco 
International Airport (SFO) and its relationship to the metropolitan Bay Area.  
The nine Bay Area TC agencies located in close proximity to each other include 
the BART commuter train service, California High Speed Rail, Caltrain regional 
commuter train service, Caltrans state highway system, adjacent local roads in both the 
City of Millbrae and the City of San Bruno, samTrans regional bus system, SFO, and 
Union Pacific national cargo train service. Figure 2 shows the area in San Francisco 
where the agencies are located. This complex network of agencies located within a nine-
square-mile area has multiple trains, rapid transit vehicles, personal vehicles, and buses 
cross through it every hour. Included in this discussion are modes of travel serving local, 
regional, and international travelers who travel by air, bus, commuter and cargo rail, and 
                                                 
16 Cynthia Kroll, “Preliminary Regional Forecast Numbers, ABAG Administrative Committee 
Agenda Item 5A,” Association of Bay Area Governments, October 6, 2015, https://abag.ca.gov/ 
planning/research/memos/Memo_PBA_Draft_Regional_Forecast_1.pdf. 
17 “Nine Bay Area Counties,” Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC), accessed April 11, 
2018, https://mtc.ca.gov/about-mtc/what-mtc/nine-bay-area-counties. 
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surface vehicles. These various modes of transportation have been grouped into three 
modes for analysis in this work: air, rail, and surface travel.  
 
Image adapted from Google Maps. 
Figure 1.  California Bay Area 
 11 
 
Image adapted from Google Maps. 
Figure 2.  Transportation Agency Locations 
The Bay Area is a strategically located transportation node that is an integral part 
of the transportation system of systems for northern California. The structures and 
facilities that support this massive network are vulnerable to emergency incidents. With 
so many agencies sharing responsibility in this area, emergency coordination is 
challenging at best. The system is vulnerable to both manmade and natural emergencies, 
and service disruptions could significantly disrupt the region. Table 1 shows how 




Table 1.   Transportation Agencies by Location  
Transit 
Center Transportation Agencies  
















Millbrae  BART State Caltrain Caltrans 
City of 
Millbrae; 
City of San 
Bruno 
samTrans SFO Union Pacific 
San 
Francisco  BART State Caltrain Caltrans 
City of San 
Francisco Misc. -- 
Union 
Pacific 
Oakland BART -- -- Caltrans City of Oakland Misc. OAK 
Union 
Pacific 
San Jose  -- State Caltrain Caltrans City of San Jose Misc. SJC 
Union 
Pacific 
Millbrae and San Francisco fall within the study area TC, while Oakland and San Jose do not. When compared 
to other areas in northern California, the TC studied in this thesis has significantly more transportation modes 
and agencies working in the same general area. 
 
This area not only has a large number of facilities, but also provides large-scale 
facilities such as SFO, a large international airport. SFO, when compared to the other 
airports in the study area, operates on a significantly higher level of service delivery. The 
TC, located adjacent to Millbrae, provides the most concentrated variation of 
transportation modes in a single location found in the Bay Area.  
A disruption in any one of these agencies’ services has the potential to affect all 
the others. For example, in 2015, a construction-related accident caused Caltrans-
operated Highway 101 to close for three days. When this agency’s facilities closed, it also 
curtailed access to SFO, BART, Caltrain, samTrans, City of Millbrae roads, City of San 
Bruno roads, and the rest of the Bay Area. SFO was accessible from only one direction. 
Access to San Francisco from the south was severely restricted. Only Union Pacific, 
which operates through traffic without citizen access, continued service through this 
period.18 At the same time, the area is highly susceptible to terrorist threats and natural 
disasters. Coordinated planning for a collaborative response to any incident will 
strengthen each individual agency’s operations and make the entire region more resilient. 
                                                 
18 Sergio Quintana and Melanie Woodrow, “All Lanes of Hwy 101 in Burlingame Closed Due to 
Downed Wires,” ABC7 News, August 28, 2015, http://abc7news.com/traffic/all-lanes-of-hwy-101-in-
burlingame-closed-due.../961574/. 
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This chapter examines services provided by each agency, the agencies’ 
relationships with each other, and the unique and common types of threats facing this 
area. This thesis suggests developing a framework to enhance emergency preparedness in 
this location; however, the suggested framework can also be used in similar metropolitan 
areas. 
Out of 10 large metropolitan regions in the United States, the Bay Area has the 
fifth highest number of daily commuter trips (see Figure 3).19 Although the number of 
trips applies to the entire Bay Area—not just the study area, which covers only nine 
square miles of the Bay Area—it is significant to show how the area compares to other 
large metropolitan regions throughout the United States.  
 
Figure 3.  Metro Area Comparison: Daily Miles Traveled in 201520 
                                                 
19 “Daily Miles Traveled,” Vital Signs, September 2017, http://www.vitalsigns.mtc.ca.gov/daily-
miles-traveled. 
20 Source: Vital Signs. 
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A large part of the reason the Bay Area’s daily commuter numbers are so high is because 
of the BART system. Daily trips from BART alone are equal to the total percent of daily 
trips in Philadelphia or Washington (approximately 100,000 daily trips).21  
The Bay Area transportation providers derive authority from a variety of federal, 
state, regional, and local agencies. Local municipalities have regular lines of 
communication established with each other, with the agencies in the region, and with 
local residents. Agencies such as the County Transportation Authority, the City/County 
Association of Governments, and various professional agencies hold regular business 
meetings to discuss items of mutual concern. However, the meeting agendas show that 
emergency management is not a typical topic of discussion.22 To enhance emergency 
preparedness and provide support for emergency responders during significant 
emergency events, emergency management should be discussed during these meetings.  
A. TYPES OF TRANSPORTATION LOCATED IN THE TC 
As mentioned, the study area’s nine transportation agencies provide three major 
types of transportation: air, rail, and surface. For the purposes of this review, Table 2 
shows the overlap between service delivery types. The table identifies a single form of air 
service that ranges from local to international, four rail service operators encompassing 
regional commuter and national cargo service, and five surface transportation operation 
providers. The transportation customers travel both locally and internationally and, as 
also previously discussed, a disruption to any one of the operations can be devastating to 
them all. 
  
                                                 
21 “BART 2017 Factsheet,” BART, June 2017, https://www.bart.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ 
BARTfactsheet_June17_0.pdf. 
22 “SMCTA Board Calendar/Meetings,” San Mateo County Transportation Authority, accessed April 
10, 2018, http://www.smcta.com/about/boardofdirectors/boardofdirectorscalendar.html; “Board of 
Directors,” City/County Association of Governments of San Mateo County, accessed April 10, 2018, 
http://ccag.ca.gov/committees/board-of-directors/. 
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Table 2.   Types of Transportation Modes in the TC 
Agency Air Rail Surface 
SFO X  X* 
BART  X  
Caltrain  X  
Union Pacific  X  
Caltrans   X 
samTrans   X 
CA High Speed Rail  X  
City of Millbrae   X 
City of San Bruno   X 
* SFO maintains airport-related roadways. 
 
1. Air Transportation 
The study area has one mode of air transportation, San Francisco International 
Airport (SFO). “SFO is a Category X airport that handles over 40-million passengers 
each year, making it the tenth largest in the United States and one of the world’s 30 
busiest airports.”23 A Category X status is reserved for larger airports that may be 
vulnerable to terrorism.24 Although SFO is located in San Mateo County, the airport is 
owned and operated by the City and County of San Francisco and, as such, is governed 
by a different entity than the county in which it is located. This factor potentially 
complicates communications during emergencies.  
According to a Bloomberg article, “commercial passenger airliners and cargo 
aircraft have been the subject of plots or attacks by bombs and fire since near the start of 
air travel.”25 The same article indicates that early bombings were aimed at achieving 
money from insurance claims. Further, the Bloomberg article points to recent airline-
related terrorist attacks that have religious and political motives. In addition to terrorism, 
airline flights have also been brought down by gunfire and missile attacks. Acts that 
                                                 
23 “SFO Expands Airport Identity Management Solution,” Quantum Secure, February 7, 2017, 
https://www.quantumsecure.com/sfo-expands/. 
24 Quantum Secure. 




target airports have become more frequent and deadly in the past decade. The number of 
people killed increases exponentially during airline accidents when compared to other 
modes of travel, which shows how important it is to develop new approaches to 
emergency preparedness. Air terrorism has been found to have a trickle-down effect on 
the overall economy; terrorism involving long-haul routes such as those from SFO has 
the most significant effect on the economy.26 
2. Rail Transportation  
Bay Area TC service providers, for both commuters and cargo, include California 
High Speed Rail, BART, Caltrain, and Union Pacific. The California High Speed Rail 
project is still in the planning stages and will eventually co-locate with BART, Caltrain, 
and Union Pacific. BART lines run along the west edge of SFO and provide service 
directly into the airport. System-wide BART services circle the bay and connect the study 
area with other regions. Currently, BART lines are co-located with Caltrain and Union 
Pacific. Caltrain is a commuter services that serves the peninsula from Santa Clara 
County to San Francisco, and Union Pacific is a cargo service that uses the same lines as 
Caltrain.  
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) considers passenger railroads 
to be “high consequence targets in terms of potential loss of life and economic disruption 
as they carry large numbers of people in a confined environment.”27 According to work 
by Barkakati and Maurer, hundreds of terrorist acts targeting passenger rail systems 
between 2004 and 2008 killed or injured over 10,000 people worldwide.28 This regional 
rail network is critical to the Bay Area way of life. In Preparedness for Mass Transit and 
Passenger Rail Emergencies, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) states that 
                                                 
26 Smialek. 
27 Steven Polunsky, “Texas Should Adapt Homeland Security Standards for High-Speed Rail,” 
Homeland Security Affairs XIV (2018), https://www.hsaj.org/articles/9298. 
28 Nabajyoti Barkakati and David Maurer, Technology Assessment: Explosives Detection 
Technologies to Protect Passenger Rail (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010).  
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“passenger rail systems face a dynamic landscape of potential natural disasters, accidents, 
and terrorist attacks.”29  
3. Surface Transportation 
The study area’s surface transportation agencies include: public roads on the SFO 
airport property, samTrans bus service, Caltrans highways (including bridges and 
interchanges), and the City of Millbrae and City of San Bruno local roads and bridges. 
In August 2015, a construction accident closed Interstate Highway 101, adjacent 
to and south of SFO, for three days (over a weekend). The accident occurred on an off-
ramp that provides access to SFO, BART, and Caltrain, which means it affected three 
legs of the nine major transportation links in the study area. Several agencies had to 
temporarily modify operations in order to continue providing service. Fortunately, loss of 
life was not an issue; however, the disruption deeply affected commuters, and the 
agencies had to implement staffing changes and service changes, and reorient access to 
facilities. The disruption also caused flight delays and massive highway backups. The 
agencies were able to successfully enact emergency plans and implement continuity of 
operations plans.30 
B. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Planning, effective leadership, and access to the right tools can be the difference 
between an effective response and a disaster.31 “Despair is most often the offspring of ill-
preparedness …. We cannot stop natural disasters but we can arm ourselves with 
knowledge: so many lives wouldn’t have to be lost if there was enough disaster 
preparedness. Preparedness, when properly pursued, is a way of life, not a sudden, 
                                                 
29 DHS Officer of the Inspector General, TSA’s Preparedness for Mass Transit and Passenger Rail 
Emergences, OIG-10-68 (Washington, DC: DHS, 2010), 2, https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-
68_Mar10.pdf. 
30 Quintana and Woodrow, “Hwy 101.” 
31 Dennis Adonis, “Local Government Crisis Communications Leadership: Building Credibility and 
Confidence through Effective Information Exchange,” whispir, accessed March 13, 2018, 
www.whispir.com/news/local-government-crisis-communications-leadership. 
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spectacular program.”32 Terrorism and natural disaster incidents are possible threats to 
the agencies operating in the Bay Area TC.  
1. Terrorism 
Transportation operators bear first-line responsibility for securing the facilities 
they operate.33 In fiscal year 2017, FEMA’s Transit Security Grant Program set aside 
$88 million to fund programs that “enhance security and resilience of surface 
transportation infrastructure.”34 Additionally, the TSA provides guidance, research, and 
training to assist surface transportation system operators.35  
Transportation systems in the Bay Area have not been a major target of terrorism 
to date; however, similar metropolitan transportation systems have repeatedly been 
targeted around the world. Bay Area transportation agencies’ security measures are not as 
intensive as the United Kingdom’s, presumably due to the perceived threat level.36 It is 
worth noting that the Bay Area has increased security measures in recent years, which 
could be mitigating serious threats. Regardless, transportation is an inviting target for 
terror groups.37 The Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) recently examined the 
number and increasing severity of attacks on transportation. Brian Jenkins, director of 
MTI’s Safety and Security Center, testified before Congress that “between 9/11 and the 
end of 2015, fatalities caused by attacks on surface transportation killing 25 or more were 
the equivalent of nine airplane losses.”38 He further noted that “the comparable number 
                                                 
32 Quotes from Don Williams, Jr., and Petra Nemcova. See “Disaster Preparedness Quotes,” Wellbeck 
Survival and Emergency Preparedness, accessed April 10, 2018, wellbeck.com/disaster-preparedness-
plan/disaster-preparedness-quotes/. 
33 “Fiscal Year 2017 Transit Security Grant Program,” FEMA, last updated June 2, 2017, 
https://www.fema.gov/fiscal-year-2017-transit-security-grant-program. 
34 FEMA. 
35 “TSA’s Successes and Challenges of Risk-Based Security,” TSA, March 26, 2012, 
https://www.tsa.gov/news/testimony/2012/03/26/tsas-successes-and-challenges-risk-based-security.  
36 A search of relevant material shows no incidents of terrorism against Bay Area transportation. 
37 Alan Levin, “Terror Stalks Commuters as Foiled Plots Show Transit Is the Target,” Bloomberg, 
May 16, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-16/terror-stalks-commuters-as-foiled-
plots-show-transit-is-target. 
38 “Transit Is a Terrorist Target,” Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI), May 31, 2016, 
http://transweb.sjsu.edu/press/Transit-Terrorist-Target. 
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of attacks against airliners and the airports that serve them is around two losses, a 
stunning comparison.”39  
With current technology, surface transportation systems cannot feasibly screen 
passengers the way airports do; because the volume of people using surface 
transportation is so large, this type of screening would cause untenable service delays. 
The large volume of customers also means that an attack can result in significant 
fatalities. For example, New York Penn Station’s peak hourly passenger volume during 
the morning rush hour is comparable to approximately 60 hours of travel at Chicago 
O’Hare International Airport.40 Airport screening is challenging; by comparison, 
however, screening during peak hours at major surface transportation facilities is a vastly 
greater challenge. Screening would result in large crowds and lengthy delays that could 
invite terrorist plots. Consequently, according to MTI, surface transportation is more 
difficult to secure than air transportation, and therefore far more likely to be the target of 
a terrorist attack.41 
Because the study area’s transportation services are concentrated in a small area 
and serve so many customers—particularly during rush hour—they offer a potential easy-
access target. Information about passenger concentration during certain times of the day, 
and at certain locations, is readily available through public sources. Additionally, 
travelers can exit an airport and enter a mass-transit rail car without screening checkpoint 
requirements. Transportation systems also house large crowds, which make them likely 
targets; in the 2017 Manchester, England, bombings, a lone-wolf terrorist set off a suicide 
bomb at the entrance to a transportation facility, in a public area where people can gather 
without going through security.  
                                                 
39 MTI. 
40 Brian Michael Jenkins and Bruce R. Butterworth, Selective Screening of Rail Passengers, MTI 
Report 06-07 (San Jose, CA: MTI, 2007), http://transweb.sjsu.edu/sites/default/files/MTI-06-07.pdf. 
41 Brian Michael Jenkins and Joseph Trella, Carnage Interrupted: An Analysis of Fifteen Terrorist 




Examining Bay Area transportation threats, MTI says, “Given scarce resources 
and relatively low levels of public concern … questions are always a part of the public 
policy matrix and not easily answered.”42 The fact that this area has not been targeted 
may be a result of the security measures already in place, but it may also simply be a 
matter of time. It is therefore prudent for the Bay Area to consider preparedness activities 
by transportation agencies in similar settings. 
2. Natural Disasters 
The 1989, 6.9-magnitiude Loma Prieta earthquake permanently changed the San 
Francisco Bay Area and dramatically affected the area’s transportation system. As a 
result of the earthquake, portions of three major roads were closed for extended periods 
of time: Interstate 880 in Oakland, and Interstates 480 and 280 in San Francisco—all of 
which provide access to the major transportation services located in the study area. Since 
Loma Prieta, the Bay Area has prioritized retrofitting and hardening highways and 
bridges.43 According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), there is a high 
probability that an earthquake of similar magnitude will occur in the Bay Area in the next 
30 years.44 There is a fault line that runs along Interstate 280, just over a mile away from 
the study area, which makes major highway corridors from SFO that provide access to 
the north toward San Francisco and Marin County more vulnerable.45 According to the 
Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG), a Loma Prieta–magnitude quake would 
disrupt service on most of the roads in this study area.46 The ABAG identifies at least 12 
interchanges or bridges within the study area—along the north, west, and south edges—
                                                 
42 Brian Michael Jenkins and Larry N. Gersten, Protecting Public Surface Transportation against 
Terrorism and Serious Crime: Continuing Research on Best Security Practices, MTI Report 01-07 (San 
Jose, CA: MTI, 2001), 4, https://www.transit.dot.gov/sites/fta.dot.gov/files/docs/terrorism_final.pdf. 
43 “Loma Prieta, the 1989 San Francisco Earthquake,” United States History, accessed April 10, 2018, 
www.u-s-history.com/pages/h2828.html. 
44 “Earthquake Hazards of the Bay Area Today,” United States Geological Survey (USGS), accessed 
April 10, 2018, https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/events/1868calif/virtualtour/modern.php. 
45 USGS. 
46 “San Mateo County Hazards: Earthquake Liquefaction & Shaking,” County of San Mateo Planning 
and Building, accessed April 10, 2018, https://planning.smcgov.org/documents/san-mateo-county-hazards-
earthquake-liquefaction-shaking. 
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that would be disrupted by an earthquake of magnitude 7.0 or higher. Road, bridge, 
runway, or track closures could also affect the operations of multiple agencies in the 
same vicinity. If co-located agencies can coordinate during emergencies, they may be 
able to provide a pool of staff, equipment, and financial resources to enhance recovery.  
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The three modes of transportation located in the study area (air, rail, and surface) 
have been targets of terrorism around the world, if not yet in the Bay Area. The area has, 
however, seen natural threats that disrupt transportation: the Loma Prieta earthquake, the 
airline disaster of 2013, and the power line outage of 2015 all affected and at times halted 
transportation service by one or more Bay Area agencies.47 Transportation sector 
operations face challenges to continuity of operations in the wake of a major disaster—
the challenges are heightened for a transportation “system of systems,” in which many 
agencies are interdependent.48 In the Bay Area, this system of systems provides routine 
convenience for citizens and serves as a basic economic engine that transports goods and 
services throughout the region.  
Disruption to critical infrastructure affects the region’s economic health; the 
region’s ability to move people and goods is critical to its resiliency. In a 2016 interview, 
Dan O’Connor, director of field operations for the chief security officer at FEMA, 
defines resilience as “the ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and 
rapidly recover from disruption due to emergencies, whether the disruption is the result of 
terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics or a catastrophic natural disaster.”49 This means the 
government must coordinate preparedness planning efforts with all sectors of the 
community. O’Connor’s comment directly applies to the study area, where multiple 
                                                 
47 “Board Meeting: Crash of Asiana Flight 214 Accident Report Summary,” National Transportation 
Safety Board, June 24, 2014, https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pages/2014_Asiana_BMG-Abstract.aspx; 
United States History, “Loma Prieta”; Quintana and Woodrow, “Hwy 101.” 
48 Michael J. DiMario, System of Systems Collaborative Formation (Singapore: World Scientific, 
2010), 87. 
49 Dan O’Connor, “Resilience in Homeland Security,” YouTube video, posted by Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security, December 7, 2016, https://www.chds.us/ed/items/15605. 
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agencies working in close proximity to each other have reporting responsibility to 











III. COMPARISON OF EMERGENCY PLANNING DOCUMENTS 
Well-coordinated emergency plans and interagency collaboration will enhance 
response and recovery when an emergency affects multiple agencies. For example, 
according to Eggers in Delivering on Digital, communication inconsistencies can mean 
an employee is able to enter an agency office in one city, but is locked out in another. 
Hassles like these, which slow progress, can lead to dire situations in a security 
context.50 For instance, when multiple fire agencies arrive at a scene and do not have 
common communication lines, confusion ensues. The agencies must devote time to 
establishing coordinated communication, which slows response to the emergency 
incident. Agencies must work together at the local level to coordinate, prepare, and 
establish resiliency operations. As FEMA says, “all disasters are local.”51 The most 
effective emergency response occurs spontaneously; advanced preparation is needed to 
ensure agencies are using common language and communication channels, and that they 
understand leadership channels.  
This chapter examines existing emergency plans for the agencies in the study area 
to determine areas of—and gaps in—coordination. While some emergency plans come 
directly from the nine agencies located in the study area, emergency plans from Cal OES 
and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) (stakeholders that are not 
physically located in the TC, but that have direct responsibility for the transportation of 
goods and services through the area) are also examined. In total, 10 main planning 
documents are reviewed in this chapter. The plans show that the agencies need additional 
coordination and collaboration. Some plans are nearly a decade old, while others address 
some of the necessary topics (such as planning or mitigation) but not others (such as 
recovery or continuity of operations). In some cases, it is possible more recent plans are 
available and were simply not located by the author. 
                                                 
50 William D. Eggers, Delivering on Digital, Kindle edition (New York: RosettaBooks, 2016), loc 
2638. 
51 Tim Manning (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2016). 
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The author obtained the plans by searching online and contacting each agency. 
Table 3 shows which documents discuss the nine Bay Area TC agencies, and which 
discuss areas of analysis used for this work in relation to those agencies: planning, 
response, mitigation, recovery, and continuity of operations. The numbers used in Table 3 
relate to the 10 documents reviewed in this work. 
1. Cal OES: “San Francisco Bay Area Regional Emergency Coordination 
Plan: RECP Transportation Subsidiary Plan,” March 200852  
2. Caltrain: “Caltrain Emergency Preparedness Plan,” September 201553 
3. Caltrans: Transit Emergency Planning Guidance, July 200754 
4. Cal OES: “State of California Emergency Plan,” October 201755 
5. Caltrans: “Emergency Function 1 Transportation Annex Executive 
Summary,” October 201356 
6. San Mateo County Transit District, “San Mateo County Transit District 
Short-Range Transit Plan Fiscal Years 2014–2023,” January 201557 
                                                 
52 Cal OES et al., “San Francisco Bay Area Regional Emergency Coordination Plan: RECP 
Transportation Subsidiary Plan” (planning document, Department of Homeland Security, March 2008), 
http://bayareauasi.org/sites/default/files/resources/RECP%2520Transportation%2520Subsidiary%2520Plan
.pdf. 
53 April Maguigad et al., “Caltrain Emergency Preparedness Plan” (planning document, Caltrain, 
September 2015). 
54 California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), Transit Emergency Planning Guidance 
(Sacramento, CA: California Department of Transportation, 2007), http://www.caloes.ca.gov/Access 
FunctionalNeedsSite/Documents/Caltrans%20Transit%20Emergency%20Planning%20Guidance.pdf.  
55 Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Mark S. Ghilarducci, “State of California Emergency Plan” (planning 
document, Cal OES, October 2017), http://www.caloes.ca.gov/PlanningPreparednessSite/Documents/ 
California_State_Emergency_Plan_2017.pdf. 
56 California State Transportation Agency, Caltrans, and California Highway Patrol, “Emergency 
Function 1 Transportation Annex: Executive Summary” (planning document, Caltrans, October 2013), 
http://www.caloes.ca.gov/PlanningPreparednessSite/Documents/01%20Transportation%20Annex%20Octo
ber%202013%20(2).pdf. 
57 San Mateo County Transit District (SamTrans), “San Mateo County Transit District Short-Range 
Transit Plan Fiscal Years 2014–2023” (planning document, SamTrans, January 2015), www.samtrans.com/ 
Assets/_Planning/2014-2023+SamTrans+Short-Range+Transit+Plan.pdf. 
25 
7. San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office, “City of Millbrae Emergency
Operations Plan: Basic Plan,” March 201758
8. City of San Bruno, “City of San Bruno Emergency Operations Plan,”
April 200859
9. California High-Speed Rail Authority, “Draft 2018 Business Plan,” March
201860 
10. MTC, “San Francisco Bay Area Regional Transportation Emergency
Management Plan,” May 200861
Table 3.   Emergency Plans by Agency 
Agency Planning Response Mitigation Recovery Continuity of Operations 
SFO 1, 10 1, 10 - 10 1 
BART 1, 10 1 - 10 1 
Caltrain 2, 3, 4 2, 3, 4 2,3, 4 - - 
Union Pacific 2, 3, 4 2,3, 4 2,3, 4 - - 
Caltrans 5, 10 5, 10 - 10 5 
samTrans 6 6 6 - - 
High-Speed 
Rail - - - - - 
City of 
Millbrae 7 7 7 - 7 
City of San 
Bruno 8 8 8 - 8 
Document key is shown in the list preceding this table; document 9, the California High-Speed Rail 
Authority “Draft 2018 Business Plan,” does not mention any of the topics.  
58 Millbrae Bureau Office of Emergency Services, “City of Millbrae Emergency Operations Plan: 
Basic Plan” (planning document, San Mateo County Sherriff’s Office, March 2017).  
59 City of San Bruno, “City of San Bruno Emergency Operations Plan” (planning document, City of 
San Bruno, April 2008). 
60 California High-Speed Rail Authority, “Draft 2018 Business Plan” (planning document, California 
High-Speed Rail Authority, March 2018), 4, https://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/about/business_plans/Draft_ 
2018_Business_Plan.pdf. 
61 MTC, “San Francisco Bay Area Regional Transportation Emergency Management Plan: Baseline 
Operating Plan” (planning document, MTC, May 2008), https://mtc.ca.gov/sites/default/files/FINAL_ 
RTEMP_May_2008.pdf. 
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Updating and standardizing these plans would provide coordination and 
collaboration that could enhance emergency situation operations. Several themes evolved 
from this work. In most cases, unless the plan addresses multiple agencies, the elements 
shown in Table 3 are not included across all agencies’ plans. Inclusion of these categories 
would improve coordination of emergency efforts. In particular, areas to consider include 
incorporating an all-hazards approach, standardizing communication methods, involving 
the whole community, coordinating resources, establishing continuity of operations plans, 
and hardening facilities.  
A. AIR, RAIL, AND SURFACE TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCY PLANS 
At the 2001 American Public Transit Association conference, Federal Transit 
Administrator Jennifer Dorn highlighted the risks facing mass transit: 
The State Department reports that in 1991, 20 percent of all violent attacks 
worldwide were against transportation targets; by 1998, 40 percent 
involved transportation targets, with a growing number directed at bus and 
rail systems. The recent attacks on the World Trade Center … remind us 
all that we must respond to a new terrorist reality—terrorism that is well 
financed, well organized and ruthless. The credible threat of increasing 
terrorism directed toward our nation’s transit systems requires that we take 
immediate prudent action to prevent, prepare for and respond to 
violence—the nature and magnitude of which was once unimaginable.62  
The following sections provide an overview of emergency planning, as found in 
the planning documents, for the three types of transportation in the Bay Area TC: air, rail, 
and surface. To show how diverse the agencies are in both their operations and users, and 
to show how vast their customer base and reach are, the sections discuss information 
about the agencies’ capacity, the services they offer, and their governance. 
1. Air Transportation
The sole air transportation provider in the TC is SFO. Administrative, operational, 
and emergency functions are located onsite. Operational responsibility for SFO falls 
62 Ronald W. Tarr, Vicki McGurk, and Carol Jones, “Intermodal Transportation Safety and Security 
Issues: Training against Terrorism,” Journal of Public Transportation 8, no. 4 (2005): 88. 
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under federal jurisdiction. If SFO needs additional resources, they would presumably 
come from San Francisco; however, San Francisco resources may be otherwise occupied 
during an emergency and may have a difficult time getting to SFO due to road closures, 
bridge failures, or similar issues. SFO is responsible for the surface transportation 
facilities that provide access to the airport, which includes approximately five miles of 
surface streets and at least four bridges on airport property. San Francisco’s emergency 
plans address all city and county facilities, including the airport, even though SFO is 
located in San Mateo County.63 During an emergency, the City of San Francisco 
provides and directs resources for the airport. Caltrain passengers may transfer to BART 
at the Millbrae Intermodal Station to travel to SFO; however, BART has eliminated direct 
service from Millbrae to SFO during certain times. 
During an emergency, the airport would be working most directly with the City 
and County of San Francisco, including for resource allocation and assistance. Immediate 
neighboring agencies in San Mateo County would provide mutual aid response. More 
than six agencies are immediately adjacent to SFO, and more than two dozen agencies 
are within immediate response distance; however, only fire and police agencies have 
mutual response agreements with SFO. This close proximity to other agencies has proven 
valuable during numerous emergencies, including when an airliner fell short of the 
runway and crashed on airport property. During emergencies, mutual aid from adjacent 
agencies has helped minimize casualties.  
Although the author could not locate stand-alone emergency plans for SFO, the 
airport is included in the MTC plans discussed later in this chapter. Cal OES’s “RECP 
Transportation Subsidiary Plan” mentions that BART and SFO coordinate directly with 
the Department of Emergency Management for San Francisco.64 However, the 
emergency plans for this area do not typically mention SFO, nor do they address 
standardizing communication among agencies or involving the community; 
                                                 
63 Cal OES et al., “RECP Transportation Subsidiary Plan.” 
64 Cal OES et al.  
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standardization and community involvement would enhance emergency preparedness for 
SFO and the TC. 
2. Rail Transportation 
The TC’s rail services transport both passengers and cargo through BART 
passenger services, Caltrain passenger services, and Union Pacific freight services. High 
Speed Rail will join these agencies in the near future. In some cases, these agencies use 
the same corridor and the same facilities and transport passengers and cargo 
simultaneously. This combination adds complexity to emergency preparedness 
considerations.  
a. BART  
Since the early 1970s, BART has provided commuter rail service throughout the 
Bay Area. In the late 1990s, new stations serving SFO and surrounding areas—including 
the study area—were added to the system. These enhancements included connections to 
Caltrain and samTrans services. Last year, 4 million BART trips were made to SFO 
alone, which equals almost 11 percent of all air travelers at SFO.65 BART is governed by 
a board of directors comprising elected officials from six counties. San Mateo is not one 
of the counties represented on the BART board. According to BART, the system has its 
own police department, which employs over 200 police officers, and maintains mutual 
aid agreements between all facilities and the communities they serve.66  
Although the author could not find emergency preparedness plans specifically for 
BART, BART is addressed in the MTC plans. Additionally, the BART website houses 
emergency plans for incidents that may occur on trains or at a station, focusing on 
ridership needs.67 The website, however, is silent regarding larger emergencies that 
affect the whole region (including the other transportation agencies) and that may require 
                                                 
65 “BART 2016 Factsheet,” BART, February 2016, https://www.bart.gov/sites/default/ 
files/docs/2016Factsheet_v11.pdf. 
66 Maguigad et al., “Caltrain Emergency Preparedness Plan.” 
67 “Go Inside Our Emergency Operations Center,” BART, June 9, 2017, https://www.bart.gov/news/ 
articles/2017/news20170609-1. 
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interaction with its mutual aid partners. BART’s administrative, operational, and 
emergency functions are located across the bay in Oakland, and may be unavailable 
during emergencies due to road closures, bridge failures, or the like.  
b. Caltrain  
Caltrain provides commuter rail services throughout the study area; trains run 
between San Francisco and San Jose with more than 62,000 riders per day.68 Caltrain is 
governed by the Peninsula Corridor Joint Powers Board (JPB), which consists of 
agencies from the three counties served by Caltrain: San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa 
Clara. Each member agency has three representatives on a nine-member board of 
directors.69  
According to Caltrain’s “Emergency Preparedness Plan,” Caltrain’s 
administrative, operations, and emergency functions are located in San Mateo County, 
approximately ten miles south of the study area.70 This proximity makes it likely that 
emergency assistance from San Mateo County would be available to Caltrain during an 
incident. The documents reviewed for this thesis did not mention mitigation and recovery 
plans for Caltrain. Rather, the plans predominately address internal operations and 
regional interplay during an emergency.71 Other agencies in the study area coordinate 
emergency planning with Caltrain, such as BART and samTrans.72 Eventually, Caltrain 
facilities will be co-located with High Speed Rail lines in this vicinity.73 
                                                 
68 Ridership numbers from 2016. “Caltrain 2016 Annual Passenger Count: Key Findings,” Caltrain, 
accessed April 16, 2018, http://www.caltrain.com/Assets/_Marketing/caltrain/pdf/2016/2016Annual+ 
Passenger+Counts.pdf. 
69 Cal OES et al., “RECP Transportation Subsidiary Plan.” 
70 Maguigad et al., “Caltrain Emergency Preparedness Plan.” 
71 Maguigad et al. 
72 Cal OES et al., “RECP Transportation Subsidiary Plan.” 
73 California High-Speed Rail Authority, “Draft 2018 Business Plan” (planning document, California 
High-Speed Rail Authority, March 2018), 4, https://www.hsr.ca.gov/docs/about/business_plans/Draft_ 
2018_Business_Plan.pdf. 
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c. Union Pacific Railroad Cargo Service 
Union Pacific Railroad operates freight services using the Caltrain right of way 
(its passenger services do not use this route). The agency maintains an operations facility 
in Oakland, 22 miles across the bay, and its dispatch center is located in Philadelphia. If 
access were blocked, it is unclear how equipment and personnel would respond to an 
emergency. The emergency plans reviewed for this thesis also do not clarify if Union 
Pacific contractually relies on Caltrain for initial emergency response. Although 
described as a separate agency operating in the TC, Union Pacific coordinates with 
Caltrain for facility maintenance and emergency efforts. The author could not find 
separate, agency-specific mitigation and recovery plans for Union Pacific, but emergency 
training, planning, response, and continuity of operations information for Union Pacific is 
included in the Caltrain document.74  
d. California High Speed Rail 
As mentioned, the California High Speed Rail project is underway, with a 
scheduled service start date in 2028.75 The project was authorized by California voters in 
2008, and includes facilities—including a railway stop—that will provide service through 
the study area.76 Although emergency plans have not been officially issued, it is 
important to discuss this project so we can begin to understand how the TC environment 
will change and become more complex for the other agencies. Emergency planners for 
High Speed Rail should consider the existing plans of the other eight agencies, and 
should coordinate with these agencies. It is important to think about coordination now, as 
the existing agencies in this TC have not set a good precedent for coordination; although 
BART currently coordinates with SFO to a large extent, it coordinates to a lesser degree 
with the other TC rail providers. Caltrain and Union Pacific have developed a plan in 
unison, but details about standardizing communication across sectors, involving the 
                                                 
74 Caltrain, “Caltrain Emergency Preparedness Plan.” 
75 California High-Speed Rail Authority, “Draft 2018 Business Plan,” 4. 
76 California High-Speed Rail Authority.  
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community, and hardening facilities have not been addressed in concert with all agencies 
in the TC.  
3. Surface Transportation 
Caltrans, SFO, two cities, and samTrans all operate surface transportation 
facilities located in or adjacent to the study area. The operations and emergency 
preparedness plans for these agencies are outlined in this section.  
a. Caltrans  
There are both state and interstate roads within the study area that fall under the 
purview of the California Department of Transportation, commonly known as Caltrans. 
According to the Caltrans website, administrative, operations, and emergency efforts for 
Caltrans are located in Oakland, with substations throughout the region.77 Caltrans is 
governed by the State of California, whose operations are based in Sacramento, about 
two hours from the study area. Caltrans’ responsibility in the study area includes: 
Interstate 101 (immediately adjacent to and west of SFO), Millbrae Avenue (which lies 
along the south border of the study area), San Bruno Avenue (which runs along the north 
border of the study area), and State Highway 82 (along the western boundary of the study 
area). This means that Caltrans has responsibility for more than six miles of local roads 
and four bridges or overpasses in the study area. Caltrans’ emergency planning efforts in 
regards to the state highway system are addressed in the July 2007 Transit Emergency 
Planning Guidance.78 According to this document, the agency’s emergency management 
efforts include “basic awareness training for transit managers [and] interagency training 
and tabletop exercises for transit staff, first responders, and emergency managers.”79 
b. City of Millbrae—Local Roads and Bridges 
The City of Millbrae maintains the local roads within the study area that are not 
part of SFO or Caltrans. This means that Millbrae maintains approximately five miles of 
                                                 
77 Google maps, accessed March 10, 2018, https://www.google.com/maps. 
78 Caltrans, Transit Emergency Planning Guidance. 
79 Caltrans, iii. 
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roads in the study area. In addition, the city has a corporation yard, which houses public 
works functions, the wastewater treatment plant, and water plant facilities. While the 
corporation yard provides personnel and equipment that may be needed for incident 
response, it is also a liability; any incident that affects the corporation yard’s operations 
will also affect utilities it houses, as well as these utilities’ availability for response 
efforts. 
The City of Millbrae is governed by an elected five-member city council, and its 
administrative, operation, and emergency resources are located in the study area. An 
appointed city manager oversees city operations, serving as the chief executive officer.  
The “City of Millbrae Emergency Operations Plan” was updated in March 2017 
to address operational issues in an emergency situation.80 The plan, prepared in 
conjunction with the San Mateo County Office of Emergency Services, establishes 
policies and procedures for effective emergency operations within the city. It is a basic 
plan that identifies a concept of operations for emergency situations, which calls for the 
city to prepare standard operating procedures and checklists that detail resources. The 
plan also calls for the city to conduct training and exercises to prepare for emergency 
operations. Mitigation information in this document coordinates with the city’s hazard 
mitigation plan.81 Furthermore, the plan identifies transportation as Essential Function – 
1 (EF-1), consistent with DHS. The plan does not specifically address how it works with 
adjacent agencies, except for one reference to working with county emergency services 
as needed, and a mention of mutual aid agreements that address public safety issues with 
adjacent agencies.  
A separate plan, the 2015 San Mateo County “Hazard Vulnerability 
Assessment”—written in collaboration with the County of San Mateo and agencies 
adjacent to the city—outlines plans to mitigate damage that might occur to city facilities 
                                                 
80 San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office, “City of Millbrae Emergency Operations Plan.” 
81 San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office of Emergency Services, “County of San Mateo Hazard 
Vulnerability Assessment: Appendix to the Emergency Operations Plan (Hazard + Risk = Vulnerability)” 
(planning document, San Mate County Sherriff’s Office, January 2015), http://hsd.smcsheriff.com/sites/ 
default/files/downloadables/2%20-%20Hazard%20Vulnerability%20Assessment.pdf. 
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and operations during both manmade and natural disasters.82 This plan, which is 
formatted according to ABAG guidelines approved by FEMA, outlines projects estimated 
to cost three times Millbrae’s annual budget.  
c. City of San Bruno—Local Roads and Bridges 
The City of San Bruno, like the City of Millbrae, maintains surface transportation 
facilities in the form of local roads and bridges. The city has administrative, operational, 
and emergency resources located just outside the boundaries of the study area. Also like 
Millbrae, San Bruno is governed by a five-member elected city council, with a city 
manager in charge of operations and serving as chief executive officer. 
The 2008 “City of San Bruno Emergency Operations Plan” addresses public and 
private property that might be affected by manmade and natural disasters.83 This plan is 
one of the most detailed and encompassing plans reviewed for this work. Although the 
city is currently in the process of updating the plan, the current plan still applies to 
emergency incidents. The document addresses emergency support functions consistent 
with the format used by DHS; transportation is given the designation Essential Sector 
Function 1 (ESF 1). The city’s response to the 2010 gas pipeline explosion in San Bruno 
shows the ability of its public safety mutual aid agreements to function well in an 
emergency. 
While the city is well organized to face emergency incidents, it has done no 
testing or exercises (beyond public safety) to prepare for events that affect multiple 
agencies, extend over prolonged periods of time, or require resources from adjacent 
agencies. The city has had difficulty overcoming the effects of prolonged recovery.84  
d. samTrans—Bus Services 
SamTrans provides bus services throughout San Mateo County. The current bus 
routes crisscross the study area, predominantly running north and south along Highway 
                                                 
82 San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office of Emergency Services.  
83 City of San Bruno, “Emergency Operations Plan.” 
84 City of San Bruno. 
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82 and Interstate 101. The San Mateo County Transit District operates samTrans, and its 
administrative, operational, and emergency resources are located within San Mateo 
County, approximately ten miles south of the study area. A general manager serves as the 
chief executive officer. SamTrans is responsible for local road and bridge construction, 
operation and maintenance, airport roads and bridges, state highway construction, and 
local bus services. 
A specific document addressing emergency planning for samTrans does not 
appear online, nor is one available directly from the agency upon request. Emergency 
planning responsibility for samTrans is linked to MTC, which is the regional planning 
agency for transportation agencies. As part of the MTC planning efforts (outlined in the 
next section), samTrans has planned for emergencies and identified response protocols; 
however, MTC documents do not provide obvious details about emergency mitigation 
and recovery. The documents identified in Table 3 provide limited information regarding 
emergency operations—specifically concerning planning, response, and mitigation—for 
samTrans.   
4. Air, Rail, and Surface Plans Conclusion 
Because some of the agencies’ administrative, operational, and emergency 
resources are not located in close proximity to the study area—and because of varying 
governing boards, mutual aid agreements, and administrative functions—the agencies 
face possible limitations when trying to access the study area during an emergency. Even 
when resources are generally available in the vicinity, a number of employees may be out 
of the area during an emergency situation and unable to access the area.  
B. CAL OES AND MTC  
Although their operating facilities fall outside the study area, Cal OES and MTC 
provide service region-wide. Cal OES’s responsibility for emergency preparedness 
covers the entire state of California; any emergency that occurs in the study area will be 
directly affected by Cal OES operations, which means this agency’s emergency 
preparedness documents have useful information that relates to the study area. In 
addition, MTC is charged with coordinating and planning for agencies located in the Bay 
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Area, which means its purview includes the study area. Neither Cal OES nor MTC has 
facilities located in the study area, but their planning documents address emergency 
preparedness for several TC agencies. These plans provide a basis for understanding the 
relationships between and preparedness levels of multiple agencies in the study area.  
1. Cal OES  
The California Emergency Services Act of 1970 established the California 
Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), which is responsible for 
coordinating statewide emergency preparation, recovery, mitigation, and plan 
integration.85 According to the Emergency Services Act, Cal OES must prepare an 
emergency plan to address manmade and natural disasters that may affect state resources. 
The “State of California Emergency Plan,” released October 1, 2017 and cited in the 
previous section, provides new updates and details on emergency planning statewide.86 
The plan devotes five pages of a nearly 190-page document to transportation, which it 
recognizes as part of the state’s critical infrastructure. The plan also recognizes that 
transportation components are interrelated with all other departments, and is designed to 
facilitate collaboration at all levels of government. The 2013 version of the plan contains 
sector-specific annexes that identify transportation as Essential Function (EF-1) within 
the primary sectors for emergency management activities. The Transportation Annex is a 
joint document of the California State Transportation Agency, the California Department 
of Transportation, and the California Highway Patrol.87  
The administration resources for the State of California are based in Sacramento, 
with local offices in San Mateo County. Operational and emergency response resources 
would presumably come from the regional office in Sacramento; at a minimum, they 
might also come from regional substation or local officers such as Foster City or Devils 
Slide/Highway 1 in San Mateo County.  
                                                 
85 California Emergency Services Act, Title 2, Chapter 7, Stats. 1970, Ch. 1454) (2007), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&sectionNum=8550. 
86 Cal OES, “State of California Emergency Plan.” 
87 Cal OES. 
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2. MTC  
In the early 1970s, the California legislature created the Metropolitan 
Transportation Commission (MTC) to coordinate the Bay Area regional transportation 
network.88 This partnership gathered the cities, counties, and agencies in nine San 
Francisco Bay areas together in pursuit of federal dollars to support the transportation 
network and to coordinate facilities and operations, as well as emergency planning. MTC 
requires each agency to prepare a Short-Range Transit Plan (SRTP). San Mateo County 
Transit District’s 2014–2023 SRTP acknowledges the agency’s role in developing 
regional transportation plans, including emergency plans.89 MTC’s 2008 “San Francisco 
Bay Area Regional Transportation Emergency Management Plan” provides emergency 
guidance for all agencies that are part of MTC.90 Although the document deals with 
planning and response issues, it has no clear plans for recovery, continuity of operations, 
and mitigation.  
C. PLANNING DOCUMENT THEMES AND GAPS 
When reviewed together, the documents point to inconsistent planning efforts, or 
specific—and important—planning efforts that are noticeably absent. For example, SFO 
emergency plans are coordinated with BART due to MTC efforts, but these plans do not 
appear to outline mitigation and recovery efforts. Continuity of effort planning is 
addressed—Caltrain, Union Pacific, and samTrans plans are well coordinated, as they are 
prepared together as a single effort, and State of California emergency plans address 
these agencies in detail. However, these plans also do not appear to address mitigation 
and recovery. City plans are coordinated with overall county plans, yet do not address 
recovery efforts. These gaps in overall coordination and collaboration can be remedied by 
joint planning efforts that extend beyond public safety sectors, and by exercising 
organizational efforts jointly such, as an EOC effort.  
  
                                                 
88 “MTC History,” MTC, accessed April 13, 2018, https://mtc.ca.gov/about-mtc/what-mtc/mtc-
history. 
89 San Mateo County Transit District, “Short Range Transit Plan.” 
90 MTC, “Bay Area Regional Plan.” 
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IV. NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CASE STUDIES  
One way to enhance emergency preparedness planning in the Bay Area TC is to 
examine relevant work in similar settings. This chapter reviews work in several U.S. and 
international cities that offer new techniques to address modern threats. The examples 
focus on implementing an all-hazards approach to emergency planning, improving 
communication, including the whole community in preparedness efforts, coordinating 
resource allocation, establishing continuity of operations, and hardening facilities.  
Because transportation is designated as a critical infrastructure sector, 
transportation agencies have worked within DHS and the Department of Transportation 
to enhance security measures. These two federal agencies provide a template for 
improved emergency preparedness that focuses on coordination and collaboration at the 
local level, in areas surrounding transportation facilities. To gather more ideas for 
improving emergency preparedness, this comparative analysis looks at recent U.S. efforts 
to enhance infrastructure resiliency in Boston, New York City, Seattle, and Oakland. 
These efforts show how U.S. transportation agencies can expand emergency planning 
activities by including the local community (not just public safety agencies) and building 
public–private partnerships that improve community coordination and resilience. 
In addition, coordination and collaboration efforts have occurred internationally in 
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. When compared to the United States, these 
countries speak predominantly the same language, have similar Western cultures and 
similar democratic structures of government, face similar security threats, and use similar 
security approaches. In each country, frameworks for coordination and collaboration 
between public safety sectors and the local community are in place. This analysis is not 
limited to public safety disciplines; it embraces a whole-community perspective. Major 
industry and professional sports in these countries also offer lessons about 
collaboration—they show examples in which the entire team prepares, trains, and 
performs together to ensure success. As threats evolve, it is critical to continue to 
evaluate what is working in other parts of the world. According to Dr. Nadav Morag’s 
book Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons, this comparative method helps 
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identify options that may be transferrable to the United States.91 When a terror incident 
occurs in the United States, the U.S. government and public safety agencies seem to react 
by immediately increasing security. Alternatively, we could respond by widening our 
preparedness spectrum to include stakeholders from the whole community in 
preparedness and recovery efforts, rather than public safety alone. To protect the 
transportation network, however, the populations that use transportation services—as 
well as the adjacent communities—must understand the scale of their transportation 
facilities.  
A. U.S. MODELS 
In the United States, innovative emergency preparedness work is taking place in 
Oakland, New York City, Boston, and Seattle. This section reviews scenarios that have 
occurred in these cities, and their innovative solutions.  
1. Oakland and FBI Multi-Agency Drill 
In the summer of 2017, the FBI organized “Operation Seasick”—a staged mock 
chemical assault on the Port of Oakland in California, in close proximity to this thesis’s 
study area. The goal of the operation was to test emergency response for an actual 
emergency of this scale and practice how local, state, and federal agencies will work 
together during a prolonged, complex attack. According to FBI Special Agent in Charge 
John Bennett, these agencies rarely work together on a day-to-day basis. Over 15 
agencies took part in this exercise, including the Oakland Police Department, U.S. Coast 
Guard, DHS, FEMA, and the FBI. While the exercise did not focus on transportation 
incidents, the outcome is translatable to transportation agencies. For example, the 
agencies in Operation Seasick discovered some of their practices unintentionally worked 
against the other agencies’ practices, and they found ways to minimize related conflict.92  
                                                 
91 Nadav Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons (San Francisco: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2011). 
92 Filipa Ioannou, “Simulated Terror Attack on Bay Tests Local Emergency Response,” SFGATE, 
June 7, 2017, https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Simulated-terror-attack-on-bay-tests-local-
11203758.php.  
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2. New York City’s Single-Purpose Plan 
In October 2016, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo proposed a major 
infrastructure upgrade that will create a transit hub complex, combining rail, bridges, 
tunnels, and road systems into a single transportation system in order to improve 
operations and financing, and heighten security.93 The governor formed an infrastructure 
task force to quickly implement technological improvements that could enhance 
resiliency—a priority for New York’s centuries-old infrastructure.94 To address 
infrastructure needs for both natural and terror-related threats, the task force is 
developing a strategic approach to institute new protocols, coordinate agencies, eliminate 
duplicate agencies, and increase staffing. This strategic approach to infrastructure 
management has significant potential to enhance overall emergency preparedness for 
New York’s transportation facilities.  
3. Boston Plans Pre-marathon 
Because Boston’s first responder and healthcare agencies embraced a flexible, 
coordinated all-hazards approach, as exemplified in DHS’s Quadrennial Homeland 
Security Review, they were able to respond swiftly to the Boston Marathon bombings in 
April 2013.95 In her master’s thesis, Anna Brooks explains that Boston agencies take part 
in annual preparations for the marathon, including drills based on after-action report 
details from previous marathon events. This preparatory work allows medical and 
security services to coordinate and adjust efforts at the national, federal, state, and local 
levels. The prior coordination, standard operating procedures, and frequent drills that 
                                                 
93 “Governor Cuomo Announces Transformational Plan to Reimagine New York’s Bridges and 
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made the Boston Marathon response successful should be lessons for other 
communities.96  
4. Seattle Information Integration Efforts 
According to the City of Seattle, poor coordination significantly hampers resource 
availability during and after emergencies; improving coordination between local and 
regional sectors that operate key segments of transportation infrastructure can aid 
information and resource sharing.97 Seattle has experienced a series of small-scale 
attacks, such as the 2011 attack on an armed forces recruiting center.98 According to 
Seattle’s report, authorities expect that any future attacks in the area will only be small 
scale as well.99 Despite the low probability of future attacks, this progressive city has 
sought to reduce its vulnerabilities. In “SHIVA—The Seattle Hazard Identification & 
Vulnerabilities Analysis,” the city discusses the need to develop procedures that integrate 
resources and information, and to work with regional partners to establish a system for 
prioritizing resources during disasters, which includes using common language among 
agencies.100  
5. Lessons Learned from U.S. Models 
The examples of current preparedness thinking in Oakland, New York, Boston, 
and Seattle point to methods for enhancing preparedness in the Bay Area TC. 
Transportation agencies should conduct joint training exercises, work across agency 
lines, plan together in advance of incidents, and share information. The next section 
reviews international models for further takeaways.  
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B. INTERNATIONAL MODELS 
Although terrorist plots in other countries have been relatively similar to those in 
the United States, plots—and actual attacks—have occurred far more frequently in other 
countries. Accordingly, those countries have more experience dealing with threats; 
emergency preparedness work in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom provides 
solid examples for the United States to follow. The ideas introduced in this section—
along with those from the previous section—form the recommendations presented in the 
next chapter. If Bay Area TC agencies implement these recommendations, they can 
significantly improve emergency preparedness operations in northern California, and can 
serve as a model for other areas throughout the nation. 
1. Australia’s Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places  
Published in 2017, Australia’s Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places from 
Terrorism refocused the country’s emergency preparedness discussion from natural 
disasters to both natural disasters and terror incidents.101 The Australian system uses an 
index scale that measures disaster resilience in communities, and helps determine policy 
and strategy work needed to improve resilience.102 The Australian system involves all 
sectors of government, the private sector, and the community in preparedness activities. 
Crowded places do not have to be buildings; large numbers of people also 
predictably gather in stadiums, transportation facilities, shopping centers, and tourist 
attractions. According to the strategy document, strengthened partnerships between 
business owners and all levels of government will provide a mechanism for coordinating 
and sharing information, which will enhance emergency preparedness.103 The strategy 
recognizes that its success rests on sustainable partnerships between private and public 
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https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/Australias-Strategy-
Protecting-Crowded-Places-Terrorism.pdf. 
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sectors and recognizes that while it is not possible to prevent disruptions, it is critical to 
reduce the likelihood and consequences of an attack.104 
Because Australia is geographically isolated, it is still a strong priority for the 
country to prepare for natural disasters, such as brushfires and other disasters not 
common in other areas. The Australian government believes these natural threats require 
regional emergency coordination; bushfires can devastate large areas populated with 
small communities that are unable to withstand the scale of disruption.105  
2. Canada: “Prevent, Detect, Deny, and Respond” Approach 
Luckily, Canada has been spared significant transportation-related terrorist 
attacks. However, since August 2016, the country’s threat level has been considered 
“medium,” meaning a violent act of terrorism could occur at any time.106 Canada’s 
approach to terrorism uses a single strategy to guide all national emergency preparedness 
efforts: the “Prevent, Detect, Deny, and Respond” approach focuses on building 
resilience. This national system also extends to the community level. For example, the 
Prevent approach involves more than just law enforcement and security; it employs cross-
cultural roundtables to strengthen the dialogue about terrorism.107 Police build 
partnerships with communities that respond to extremism.108 The Canadian approach to 
emergency preparedness uses early role definition and includes local segments in all 
emergency preparedness efforts.  
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Public Safety Canada is a Cabinet-level office that focuses on emergency 
preparedness.109 This office integrates business leadership, health officials, utility 
company officials, and others into emergency preparedness efforts. Each segment of the 
community is involved in planning and has assigned roles and responsibilities to support 
emergency efforts. The Canadian system uses Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBRs) 
to enhance communication, clarify roles and responsibilities, and develop and maintain 
up-to-date plans. COBRs coordinate tiers of response and emphasize two-way 
communication between Category 1 (public safety) and Category 2 (local community). 
To accomplish this coordination, Canadians set up a national cross-sector forum that 
promotes information sharing across sectors. This forum establishes communication 
between communities and creates seamless emergency management, integrated public 
safety, and community safety through Joint Emergency Planning Partnerships. The 
program funds innovative projects that emphasize cross-discipline approaches, such as 
those between planning, engineering, and environmental sciences components. 
Community education and participation is critical to combatting terrorism110 This multi-
layered approach acknowledges a complex, jurisdictional breakdown of responsibilities 
that could be applied to the Bay Area TC.111  
3. The United Kingdom: Local Community Forums 
The United Kingdom has been dealing with a greater level of terrorism for a 
longer period of time than either Canada or the United States. As such, their lessons 
learned offer useful ways to improve emergency preparedness. Compared to the United 
States, the United Kingdom has fewer agencies involved in emergency response, which 
creates smoother, less complex lines of communications.112 The United Kingdom’s 
emergency preparedness and recovery model focuses on partnerships between industry, 
utilities, and all levels of government. To heighten communication, the country hosts 
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annual security showcases to introduce stakeholders to the latest methods and equipment; 
these showcases make new tools readily available to all segments of the community, 
rather than limiting them to law enforcement.113 The UK government also has a cabinet 
office responsible for assuring that regional training and resources are available for 
coordinated planning efforts.  
Emergency efforts are well coordinated between local UK law enforcement 
agencies and other segments of the communities they serve. According to Morag, unlike 
the U.S. model, the United Kingdom treats operators of critical infrastructure as 
Category 2 first responders, who can assign roles in crisis situations; in the United 
Kingdom, Category 2 responders—in accordance with the Civil Contingencies Act—
must form local community forums to assist with community response efforts.114 Each 
community also maintains a website that addresses methods of local preparedness in 
support of law enforcement efforts.115  
Emergency preparedness in the United Kingdom is consistent nationwide with a 
system based on four P’s: Prepare, Protect, Prevent, and Pursue. The mayor and local 
staff regularly discuss contingency plans and, unlike in the United States, emergency 
preparedness efforts involve all segments of the local community, including local 
businesses such as refuse collectors and hotels. Examples of collaborative efforts in the 
United Kingdom and include: 
• The Exercise Unified Response (EUR), which was conducted between 
February 29 and March 3, 2016, is the largest and most complex 
emergency services exercise ever held in the United Kingdom—and 
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potentially in the European Union. The exercise involved 70 international 
and local teams.116  
• The London Resilience Partnership, funded by the European Union, 
coordinates response to large-scale emergencies by working effectively 
with national and international partners. The partnership ensures 
appropriate arrangements are in place to support civil protection 
mechanisms and to increase skills of both responders and facilitators 
through the provision of a unique training opportunity.117 
• Operation Strong Tower was conducted in London and Surrey between 
June 30 and July 1, 2015. The operation was commissioned by the Home 
Office National Program Board and developed by the Metropolitan Police 
Service in conjunction with the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism, 
plus 25 partner agencies; it  involved multiple sites and multiple 
incidents.118 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The national and international activities presented in this chapter provide a 
roadmap to improved preparedness for the Bay Area TC. Based on these case studies, this 
roadmap includes using an all-hazards approach, allowing transportation-sector personnel 
to coordinate with each other and monitor each other’s systems, creating multi-discipline 
teams to prepare and effectively handle emergencies, hardening infrastructure, 
conducting joint-agency operations, planning multi-day incident exercises, and including 
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all segments of the community in planning—from industry and utilities to all levels of 
government.  
In the next chapter, this thesis develops policy recommendations to address gaps 
identified in the case studies and other research. The thesis uses a matrix of emergency 
plans to analyze current conditions and propose solutions for the Bay Area TC. This 
format can be applied to other regional transportation centers as well to determine their 
level of preparedness for complex disasters that affect more than one agency. 
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V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter provides research findings and recommendations and outlines 
preparatory steps agencies should take to limit service disruptions and enhance 
coordination and collaboration during emergencies. These recommendations are intended 
to improve upon gaps identified in the research. Recommendations include changes to 
public policy and may have public safety implications; they are designed to improve 
comprehensive and effective operations across agency lines.  
A general best practice is to include all sectors in communication and planning 
activities. The Bay Area TC agencies need innovative crisis management skills to address 
new threats, as well as to address inconsistencies that hamper communication. 
Jurisdictions and agencies are no longer simply focusing on a single point of failure or an 
incident that spans a single day. To improve coordination, the TC agencies will need to 
work on coordinating plans and co-locating emergency operations facilities. The more a 
professional sports team practices, prepares, coordinates, and collaborates, the more 
likely the team is to have a successful season; similarly, firefighters take part in frequent 
drills that allow them to work together, and that enhance the success of fire emergency 
response. The same factors that create successful response in sports and in public safety 
hold true in all sectors of emergency response.  
Several concepts will allow transportation agencies to enhance coordination and 
collaboration for emergency preparedness. The concepts can be generally grouped into 
six categories:  
• adopt an all-hazards approach to emergency planning, 
• improve communication, 
• approach emergency preparedness as a whole community, 
• establish methods for continuity of operations over extended periods of 
time, 
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• establish methods to coordinate resource allocation, and 
• harden infrastructure. 
These categories are described in the following sections. 
A. ALL HAZARDS 
An all-hazards approach means treating natural disaster planning the same as 
planning for terrorist threats. Emergency planning should be considered an issue that 
addresses all types of extraordinary operations. Agencies should implement advanced 
planning and preparation efforts for special events. Canada has implemented this all-
hazards approach for disasters and terror incidents; Canada’s success can serve as an 
example of multiple agency coordination and collaboration for the Bay Area TC.  
B. COMMUNICATION 
Currently, transportation agencies in the study area do not recognize identification 
badges of personnel from adjacent agencies (other than for public safety agencies). 
During an emergency, this prevents valuable, trained personnel from crossing into 
emergency site access points. To address security concerns, the agencies should establish 
a common form of identification using existing TSA systems. Additionally, public safety 
communication channels used on emergency sites (such as radios) do not allow all-
encompassing use of a single channel for onsite emergency communications; instead, 
cross-agency communication must be established onsite when emergency response 
begins, which is time consuming. 
According to the Texas Division of Emergency Management, one method for 
enhancing emergency operations is to consolidate “radio communication between 
multiple departments … in advance of an incident.”119 These lines of communication 
should be established in advance to facilitate swift transfer to common channels. This 
should include all adjacent cities, fire, police, and special district operations. The Texas 
                                                 
119 “After Action Report & Improvement Plan,” Texas Division of Emergency Management, accessed 
April 17, 2018, 6, https://www.dps.texas.gov/dem/documents/afterActionRptInstr.pdf. 
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Division of Emergency Management also discusses the need for coordination between 
agencies’ information technology (IT) departments to provide server access for critical 
agencies in EOCs. To address this issue, agencies can prepare a needs assessment for the 
communication systems they believe will be needed during emergencies.  
Because their operational channels transmit on different frequency ranges, 
communication between transportation agencies and first responders at an incident can be 
challenging. A simple way around this—at least during minor incidents—is to establish 
an incident command structure onsite that employs a transportation representative who 
acts as liaison between incident command and dispatch. In December 2010, Caltrain held 
a simulation of a derailment and onboard fire inside a tunnel near the border between San 
Francisco and San Mateo County; during the exercise, first responders were not able to 
communicate with other responding agencies. While this issue has since been corrected, 
it identifies a concern that needs to be addressed holistically within the transportation 
agencies’ emergency planning efforts. The study area has agencies that are not all 
anchored to San Mateo County, such as SFO, BART, Caltrans, and Union Pacific. 
Securing the channels of communication across all agencies, regardless of organizational 
governance, will provide the ease of communication necessary for successful emergency 
operations.  
Planning reliable communication methods is a critical emergency management 
practice. Mobile communication sources or Communication on Wheels stations (COWs) 
have become successful tools for special-incident communication. COWs have 
effectively expanded high-demand network coverage through use of temporary or 
portable cell towers mounted on trailers, vans, or trucks. Whenever large groups of 
people gather, there is a big demand for this type of connectivity. Agencies that are co-
located should consider providing expanded cellular network coverage and planning in 
advance for communications needs. COWs have been used effectively during the 
following events:  
• September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City 
• Hurricane Katrina, U.S. Gulf Coast, August 23–31, 2005 
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• A slide fire in Arizona, May 20–June 5, 2014 
• Mardi Gras in New Orleans, March 2015 
• Hurricane Matthew, South Carolina, September 28–October 10, 2016  
• Presidential inauguration on the National Mall in Washington, DC, 
January 2017 
• Super Bowl LI in Houston, Texas, February 5, 2017 
• NCAA Final Four at the University of Phoenix, April 1–3, 2017120  
The photo in Figure 4 is an example of a COW facility that can be stored near the area 
study area, such as in the San Bruno Corporation yard, to provide easy access when 
needed. 
 
Figure 4.  Communication on Wheels Facility121 
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Another way to improve emergency incident communication is to establish a 
trunk system like the one found in Santa Clara County’s “BAY MAC,” established by 
Umunhum Development Corporation in the 1950s to provide communication to rural 
areas.122 The system is privately owned but serves as a key piece of the countywide 
communication system. Region-wide emergency planning for Super Bowl 50 in 2016 
took advantage of this system. The study area transportation agencies, too, could 
coordinate with private communication groups in advance and include them in drills and 
training exercises.  
C. WHOLE COMMUNITY 
The “whole community” concept, as discussed in the National Preparedness Goal, 
refers to “the participation of a wide range of players from the private and nonprofit 
sectors, including nongovernmental organizations and the general public, in conjunction 
with the participation of Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial governmental partners 
in order to foster better emergency coordination.”123 The national and international best 
practices identified in the previous chapter show the benefits of including the whole 
community in preparedness efforts. “As a concept, Whole Community is a means by 
which residents, emergency management practitioners, organizational and community 
leaders, and government officials can collectively understand and assess the needs of 
their respective communities and determine the best ways to organize and strengthen 
their assets.”124 
The whole-community approach has not been implemented in the study area TC. 
Before emergencies occur, transportation agencies should cooperate with local agencies 
to create agreements and coordinate plans beyond the first responder level. How the local 
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community defines recovery will require additional preparations in the emergency 
planning stage. In the existing emergency management plans reviewed for this thesis, any 
connection the transit agencies have with adjacent communities for emergency response 
was vague beyond the first responder level.  
Currently, residents must wait for the government to arrive with aid during 
emergencies; a whole-community approach, instead, creates a culture of enhanced 
personal preparedness. In recent hurricanes in Florida and Puerto Rico, for example, 
FEMA resources were overwhelmed. A whole-community approach will allow 
transportation agencies to take the lead in local preparedness. Working with labor groups, 
community nonprofits, and citizen groups in advance to encourage personal preparedness 
for employees and community volunteers will increase the pool of individuals available 
for emergency response assistance. According to FEMA’s 2015 National Preparedness 
Goal, transportation agencies at all levels should collaborate and form relationships with 
local organizations that have access to transportation resources, including equipment, 
personnel, fuel, and maintenance facilities that can be made available for emergency 
response.125 Emergency responders may need access to specialized equipment when 
responding to emergencies, and during recover efforts. Planning availability of 
specialized vehicles may be especially important for successful response activities. 
Advance planning activities should include non-safety equipment available in the 
surrounding community that may be accessed during emergencies. A whole-community 
approach to emergency management gives responders access to additional resources, 
including those gained through public–private partnerships. FEMA’s experience in recent 
disasters has shown that bringing in a huge number of surge-force employees from other 
parts of the country has some limitations. Typically, FEMA responders are sent to an area 
and have direct responsibility. It seems the local conditions and practices take a while to 
connect with this surge force. Perhaps a good approach is to establish local or regional 
FEMA surge skeletal teams that can interface between the locals, who have knowledge of 
customs and resources, and the FEMA experts who are sent to assist communities. 
                                                 
125 DHS. 
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D. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS 
Transportation agencies should consider establishing plans to continue operations 
in the event that key staff are unavailable during emergencies. Continuity of operations 
plans typically outline how an organization will respond to disruptions by defining 
backup procedures to maintain and support critical functions. Cross-sector and cross-
agency training and exercises will ensure the plans are effective during actual 
emergencies. Routine training exercises also ensure employees are familiar with the 
plans. Agencies should also use after-action reports to improve emergency operations 
over time.  
While transportation agencies in the study area should be concerned with 
continuity of operations, so should the adjacent communities—after all, the transportation 
agencies allow people and goods to travel to and from the area, and these services will be 
affected during an emergency. One method of improving community confidence is to 
include all segments of the community in emergency planning. These efforts might 
include identifying resources, ensuring that allocation of resources is coordinated and not 
duplicative, and ensuring resources are allocated to those who need them most. The 
simplest solution is to include the entire community in planning efforts; this will ensure 
that everyone involved knows who will be in charge and what the priorities will be before 
an emergency occurs.  
E. COORDINATED RESOURCE ALLOCATION  
Over-allocation of resources is a common difficulty in emergency work. There are 
several solutions, including noncompetitive procurement and pre-determination of 
resource availability and allocation. Emergency preparations should ensure that the 
agencies’ regulations permit the use of a noncompetitive procurement in declared 
emergency situations, as defined by FEMA. When routine practices will cause delays 
during an emergency, the FEMA system allows agencies to operate outside the normal 
requirements for purchasing. However, FEMA also states that coordinating in advance 
with local vendors and developing mutual aid agreements across all sectors will enhance 
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emergency response.126 To prevent over-allocation of resources, agencies should identify 
resources in advance, ensuring that allocation is coordinated, efforts are not duplicated, 
and resources are properly prioritized. According to planning documents, each agency in 
the study area independently allocates resources. In some cases, a single resource has 
been allocated by multiple agencies.  
Emergency preparedness plans should address management of equipment and 
vehicles, including issues such as advance fueling, how to access the equipment and 
vehicles, and how to ensure resources are still in place and accessible in the event that an 
emergency wipes out one location’s resources (i.e., “splitting”). Plans should address the 
agencies’ resources, but should also account for excess equipment and vehicles generated 
as a result of managing the emergency. Developing protocols to address the readiness of 
standing vehicles, movement of vehicles into and out of emergency areas, and locating 
equipment in areas not affected by the emergency or in the way of recovery functions 
will help recovery efforts. These issues were not addressed in the agency plans reviewed 
for this work.  
Additionally, no-fare policies should be implemented before emergencies to allow 
easier vehicle boarding and to eliminate the need for money handling during 
emergencies.127 Continuity of operations plans should provide for stockpile vehicles 
stored and maintained in preparation for emergency use. These plans should be 
developed across all sectors to include non-transportation agencies such as schools and 
health facilities.  
F. HARDENED INFRASTRUCTURE  
“The cost for physically protecting facilities, also known as hardening, is an 
eligible expense in Federal Transportation Agency grant applications.”128 California 
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cities are required to prepare hazard mitigation plans.129 These plans are tied to a city’s 
budget, as well as to capital improvement plans that typically span five years and use a 
cost-benefit analysis to focus funding on highest-priority improvements needed for 
emergency preparation. Caltrans also says that agencies should “ensure that new facilities 
are designed to withstand natural disasters and other emergencies, and provide shelter for 
agency personnel.”130 Agencies can prudently adopt the FEMA hazard mitigation 
approach of establishing a priority list of projects to protect existing assets. This list can 
be used to pursue funding that reduces exposure of the agency assets to service 
disruptions. For example, the Federal Transportation Agency developed a Hazard 
Mitigation Cost Effectiveness Tool that helps organizations determine which 
improvements will result in the greatest value.131 
G. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter has identified recommendations for enhancing emergency 
preparedness coordination and collaboration. The next chapter reviews governance in 
place and discusses methods that can be used to improve accountability. The ultimate 
solution is to create an emergency services joint powers agency (JPA), which introduces 
the concept of a regional transportation emergency operations center (RTEOC) as a 
possible component.  
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VI. THE PATH FORWARD 
Several lessons learned from this analysis can define a path forward for the 
transportation agencies in the study area. The agencies should expand their emergency 
planning practices to provide common ground and overlap in preparedness activities. 
This type of planning will be helpful for incidents that affect multiple agencies, but will 
also be helpful for the individual agencies themselves.  
A. COLLABORATIVE EXERCISES 
Taking a cue from other U.S. cities, the agencies should consider holding regular 
and collaborative emergency operations exercises (like those in Boston), giving 
responsibility for coordination efforts to a single entity (like New York City does), and 
holding drills that extend over several days and that involve agencies from both inside 
and outside the area (as in Oakland). In light of the international case studies, the 
agencies should consider forming public–private partnerships and including local sectors 
in preparedness efforts to enhance resiliency. 
B. LOCAL-LEVEL EFFORTS 
The U.S. government has designated DHS as the single agency responsible for 
emergency preparedness. DHS efforts have focused on public safety at the national or 
state level. Now, efforts should prioritize coordination at the local level. Because local-
level efforts can involve local government, businesses, and regional agencies in 
emergency planning, they have great potential to improve transportation sector 
emergency preparedness. As part of this effort, local government could develop an 
agreement that would engage the various agencies and compel them to work together. 
Additionally, formation of an emergency joint powers agency (JPA) would more clearly 
define the role of SFO and BART among their adjacent agencies. For example, an 
emergency involving air travel that occurs outside the boundaries of SFO would require 
assistance from SFO and adjacent partners, depending on the exact location and 
magnitude of the incident.  
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C. JOINT POWERS AUTHORITY 
Currently, although the agencies are accustomed to working collaboratively, they 
each have their own governance structures, which makes coordination difficult. To help, 
they can establish a single JPA to govern all their emergency operations and to ensure the 
agencies have equal authority and responsibility during emergencies. A JPA could bring 
the agencies together with local government, businesses, and other regional agencies to 
prepare for and coordinate emergency operations. The JPA’s powers should extend to 
recovery efforts as well, including those that take place over an extended period of time 
or that are still occurring (such as the 2010 San Bruno PGE gas explosion). Special 
legislation may be needed to create a framework for emergency response that allows all 
the agencies to share power, and that grants special privileges to law enforcement 
agencies that operate in close proximity to the study area. Furthermore, a JPA can also 
determine where the RTEOC will be located, and how it will be staffed and financed. 
D. REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCY OPERATIONS 
CENTER 
Furthermore, formation of a regional transportation emergency operations center 
(RTEOC) would allow agencies to define operational responsibility during critical 
incidents. It would also eliminate ambiguities by providing more structured processes, 
and would decrease the likelihood that the agencies will need to compete for resources 
during a large-scale or prolonged emergency. An RTEOC would better equip the region 
to make security decisions that consider all opinions and interests.  
Given the number of agencies co-located in the study area, it is likely that an 
attack or prolonged natural disaster will affect all the agencies. The region’s existing 
emergency preparedness efforts focus only on general emergencies, and EOC facilities 
are 15–20 miles away. During heavy commuter times, it can take over an hour to travel 
from an EOC to the study area. Additionally, access to the area may be blocked during an 
emergency, and the existing EOCs are small-scale, which means they may be occupied 
by local needs during an emergency. The study area needs a specialized transit EOC. 
Although there is a regional emergency operations center in the area, it is located across 
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the bay in Alameda County and its focus is general purpose law enforcement, not 
transportation. Once established, an RTEOC can serve both transportation and other 
emergency incident needs, taking on a multipurpose role in the region.  
This thesis has identified a need for enhanced coordination and collaboration in 
emergency preparedness practices. Because the plans for California High Speed Rail are 
still being developed, it is an opportune time to raise—and address—this issue. Currently, 
the MTC emergency plan addresses four of the nine agencies: SFO, BART, Caltrain, and 
samTrans; however, it does not address all phases of emergency preparedness.132 Other 
planning documents for the TC agencies vary in age, and some, including the MTC plan, 
are 10 or more years old. MTC is predominantly a planning and funding agency; it does 
not directly operate any transportation services. Additionally, MTC does not operate an 
EOC. When an incident occurs, the regional emergency operations center determines 
which EOC will take responsibility. In several instances, the agencies located in the study 
area have undertaken emergency preparedness efforts jointly. And, in some cases, their 
emergency plans are well coordinated and effective, if dated. Establishing an RTEOC 
within the study area can accomplish the goal of enhanced coordination. However, this 
will require the agencies to address governance structure, financing mechanisms, and 
location concerns. 
One option for an RTEOC would be to expand one of the existing agencies, such 
as the San Mateo County EOC, San Francisco EOC, or MTC. Alternatively, creating a 
new agency could help bring partners together. However, since there are already nine 
existing agencies, it may be more efficient to work with an existing facility. Although the 
individual agencies are not big enough to successfully accomplish the task on their own, 
they may be able to by working together. Funding for an RTEOC facility, staff, and 
equipment could come from the special legislation mentioned previously, the agencies in 
the study area, and DHS—some local hazard mitigation needs may qualify for DHS 
funding. Establishing an RTEOC in central San Mateo County, which encompasses the 
study area, will enable regular joint exercises that include agencies external to the study 
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area as well, such as San Mateo County and San Francisco City and County, MTC, the 
FBI, FEMA, and DHS.  
E. STANDARDIZING PLANS 
Additionally, the regional EOC should update all plans with an eye for 
standardization. This will help simplify coordination between the agencies during 
emergencies. The regional EOC could also establish a credentialing program for local 
administrative personnel, which would provide training for first responders, 
transportation operators, and public administrators. 
F. SFO 
SFO is a major player in the study area. As mentioned, the airport is located in 
San Mateo County but is governed and regulated by San Francisco City and County, and 
also by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Due to the complex regulatory and 
reporting implications, SFO does not generally participate in San Mateo County EOC 
exercises that do not directly involve the airport property. However, SFO, a Category X 
airport and an international hub, attracts visitors from around the world and is vulnerable 
to an isolated attack; if an attack were to limit the airport’s operations, the effects would 
be seen across the Bay Area and beyond. Accordingly, SFO should be invited to join an 
emergency JPA, and should be included as an associate member of the San Mateo 
County Emergency Services Council. Including SFO will enhance transportation-related 
communication and information sharing regarding key regional data, intelligence, policy, 
and decision making. Further, including SFO in exercises will allow all regional facilities 
(as well as first responders) to become more familiar with the facility.  
G. BART 
Although BART did not originally have facilities in San Mateo County, its 
facilities eventually expanded into San Mateo; the county’s representation on the BART 
board did not expand to follow suit. This gives San Mateo County a more limited role in 
the area’s emergency operations. Although adding a seat on the BART board of directors 
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for San Mateo County is a complex issue, it would enhance coordination and 
collaboration. 
H. SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS 
Following the terrorist attacks of 2015, the French government enacted 
regulations that give law enforcement greater flexibility in areas such as house arrest, and 
search and seizure.133 According to the New York Times, the regulations also give law 
enforcement greater ability to set up check points for extended periods of time near 
airports, ports, and train stations that offer international service in order to restrict access 
to areas that are vulnerable to terrorism.134 However, this type of security enhancement 
comes at the expensive of civil liberties; while it may be a productive solution to address 
terrorism in certain regions, it would be met with controversy in northern California.  
I. IMPLEMENTATION: PROOF-OF-CONCEPT APPROACH 
This thesis suggests that the way forward for enhancing transportation emergency 
preparedness is to conduct exercises that include non–public safety personnel, and 
address communication and resource allocation. A first step could be a proof-of-concept 
approach that includes establishing a test RTEOC for a year and conducting regular 
exercises in an existing facility. This would provide a low-cost opportunity for the nine 
agencies to realize the benefits of a JPA and RTEOC, and would allow them to consider 
siting, funding, and staffing a permanent facility.  
J. CONCLUSION 
These concepts could also be employed in other jurisdictions that have multiple 
co-located agencies, and that require detailed coordination and collaboration to 
successfully address emergency preparedness and response. Establishing an RTEOC in 
the study area will provide a model for similar national transportation centers—a model 
that has been called for in previous research. For instance, in his 2016 master’s thesis, 
                                                 
133 Alissa J. Rubin and Elian Peltier, “French Parliament Advances a Sweeping Counterterrorism 
Bill,” New York Times, October 3, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/world/europe/france-
terrorism-law.html. 
134 Rubin and Peltier. 
 62 
Brian Seals calls for agencies to work in advance of an emergency to infuse adaptability 
into standard operating procedures.135 Similarly, the TSA calls for “using collocation and 
pre-incident preparation to get various agencies on the same page.”136 According to the 
TSA, “passenger rail agencies and transportation agencies in general may not be 
adequately prepared to handle all emergencies or mitigate their consequences.”137 DHS 
(of which the TSA is one component) and the Department of Transportation work jointly 
to fund and sponsor connecting communities’ workshops to coordinate transit systems’ 
resources with local, county, and state emergency managers.138 These funds could 
appropriately be used as a resource to establish an RTEOC. 
  
                                                 
135 Brian Seals, “Thesis Proposed Infusing Adaptability into Standard Operating Procedures,” Center 
for Homeland Defense and Security, October 25, 2016, https;//www.chds.us/c/item/4359?utm_source= 
snapshots&utm_campaign=s_2016-12-20.  
136 DHS Office of the Inspector General, TSA’s Preparedness.  
137 DHS Office of the Inspector General. 
138 DHS Office of the Inspector General. 
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